

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 158511 TOSEC 050136

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ISRAELIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. IN ORDER TO KEEP MAC TOON IN THE PICTURE, AS THE ISRAELIS WILL ASSUME HE IS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE NOW BEGIN THE PRACTICE OF BRIEFING HIM DISCREETLY ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS HERE. THEREFORE, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE THE TELEGRAM BELOW TO BE SENT TO HIM ON AN EYES ONLY BASIS.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE. TO TEL AVIV FOR THE AMBASSADOR EYES ONLY FROM THE SECRETARY: AS YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED I MET WITH DINITZ IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND SISCO HELD A LENGTHY FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN WASHINGTON BEFORE DINITZ DEPARTED TO ISRAEL JULY 3. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND TO BE HELD IN ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE, I WANT YOU TO HAVE THE ESSENCE OF THESE MEETINGS TO KEEP YOU UP TO DATE WITH DEVELOPMENTS HERE.

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3 BOTH TALKS REVOLVED AROUND DINITZ' REQUEST FOR CLARI-

FICATION OF THE EGYPTIAN OR U.S. POSITION IN THREE AREAS:
THE ISSUES OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE STRATEGY ON
STEPS THAT WOULD BE TAKEN FOLLOWING AN INTERIM AGREEMENT,

BILATERAL RELATIONS.

4. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, DINITZ PUT THE FOLLOWING QUEST-
IONS:

A. CAN WE BE SURE THAT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY LINE IN THE
NEW AGREEMENT WILL EXTEND UP TO THE LINE WHICH INCLUDES
THE PRESENT BUFFER ZONE?

B. WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW WITH
REGARD TO THE EASTERN LINE ON THE EASTERN SLOPES OF THE
PASSES, BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE GIDI AND THE MITLA?

C. IS THE LINE WHICH WE PROPOSED BETWEEN THE PASSES AND
THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR ACCEPTABLE?

D. IS IT POSSIBLE, TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE MIGHT BE A
CHANGE IN OUR LINE IN THE PASSES, TO MOVE THE NORTHERN
LINE (OUR BLUE LINE) WESTWARD IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR
NORTHERN COMPLEX?

E. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES THAT THE U.S. SEES AS NEEDED WITH
REGARD TO THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR TO ABU-RHODIES?

F. CAN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM STATIONS BE MANNED BY
AMERICAN AND ISRAELI PERSONNEL, AND AMERICAN AND EGYPTIAN
PERSONNEL RESPECTIVELY?

G. WHAT EXACTLY ARE THE EGYPTIANS PREPARED TO DO IN THE
AREA OF ECONOMIC BOYCOTT?

H. WHAT ARE THE EGYPTIANS PREPARED TO DO IN THE FIELDS OF
DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA WARFARE?

I. IS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SIZE OF THE EGYPTIAN FORCES
AND ARMAMENTS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT REMAINS THE SAME AS IN
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THE OLD ONE, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE NUMBER OF TANKS
CAN BE RAISED TO 70 TO 75?

5. YOU WILL NOT WANT TO ADDRESS ANY OF THESE ISSUES YOUR-
SELF BECAUSE THE RECORD IS DETAILED AND RANGES OVER MANY
CONVERSATIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE
EGYPTIANS. FYI, WE BROKE NO NEW GROUND AND PARTICULARLY
STRESSED TWO POINTS: (A) THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IS CLEAR

THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST MOVE OUT OF THE PASSES AND THAT, TO THEM, THIS MEANS AN ISRAELI POSITION SEVERAL KILOMETERS EAST OF THE FOOT OF THE PASSES. WE DID NOT ENDORSE THE EGYPTIAN POSITION BUT STATED IT SO THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD

HAVE NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE EGYPTIANS BELIEVE IS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT. (B) WE HIT VERY HARD THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT ARE RAISED BY ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL FOR PARALLEL ROADS TO THE OIL FIELDS WHICH ARE SIDE BY SIDE AT SOME POINTS. WHILE DINITZ STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING ISRAELI MOBILITY BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN COMMANDS, WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT MAY JUST NOT BE PRACTICAL TO THINK IN TERMS OF TWO PARALLEL ROADS GIVEN THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TERRAIN IN THIS AREA AND SADAT'S REJECTION OF THE IDEA.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF A STRATEGY FOR THE STEPS THAT WOULD FOLLOW AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, DINITZ MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. IF THERE WERE TO BE ANOTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA, WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED WOULD BE ONLY COSMETIC. ISRAEL IS NOT ADVERSE TO NEGOTIATING WITH SYRIA BUT WANTS THIS UNDERSTOOD.

B. IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO BEGIN ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, ISRAEL WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE ITS LINE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BUT MUST REMAIN ON THE HEIGHTS.

C. WITH REGARD TO JORDAN, ISRAEL SEES NO PROSPECT FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT BUT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. ISRAEL HOPES THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST ACCORDING RECOGNITION TO THE PLO.

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D. ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATION OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT, THE FIRST POINT IS THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE DURING THE PERIOD OF AN INTERIM EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. NOT SUBMIT ANY PLAN FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE U.S. PREVENT ANY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT ANY PLAN NOT PREVIOUSLY AGREED WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE U.S. ON WHAT CAN BE DONE IN AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

7. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, DINITZ MENTIONED ISRAEL'S NEED FOR GENERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE; ISRAEL'S DESIRE FOR A CONTINUING FLOW OF ARMS IN FULFILLMENT OF ISRAEL'S MATMON B PLAN; AND ISRAEL'S DESIRE WITH RESPECT TO VACATING THE SINAI OIL FIELDS FOR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION, A COMMITMENT

BY THE U.S. FOR CONTINUING SUPPLY IN CASE ISRAEL'S OIL
SUPPLY LINES ARE INTERRUPTED, AND U.S. COOPERATION IN
BUILDING OIL STORAGE FACILITIES.

8. ON THE SUBJECTS RAISED IN PARAS 6 AND 7, WE KEPT OUR
OPTIONS OPEN, BUT INDICATED AN INTENTION TO RESPOND SYM-

PATHETICALLY ON THE PROBLEMS ISRAEL WOULD FACE IF AN
INTERIM AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED. SISCO

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